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 Back to the Future 




Forthcoming in International Affairs 
 
 
In December 2015 after 14 years of what—by any measure—had been a torturous 
process, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Doha round of multilateral trade 
negotiations was finally set to one side.  Utilising a negotiating process widely regarded 
as the most inclusive in WTO history,2 members agreed at the organisation’s 10th 
ministerial conference (held in Nairobi, Kenya) to “park” their not inconsiderable 
attempts to agree a member-wide deal opening the way for them to embark instead on a 
series of single-issue “plurilateral” negotiations.   
 
The round had been designed to help improve the trade performance of developing 
countries while also adding welfare gains across-the-board but had instead resulted in 
very little of substance.  Yet, rather than being greeted with consternation and regret—as 
had been the outcome of many previous WTO ministerial conferences that had agreed 
to disagree on what to do with the Doha round—the Nairobi conclusion was met with 
widespread relief and, in some quarters, elation.  As the Financial Times editorial of 21 
December 2015 put it,  
 
After a death scene so drawn-out it would have done credit to a Victorian 
melodrama, the curtain has finally come down on one of the longest-
running farces in global policymaking. The so-called Doha round … was last 
week declared dead by World Trade Organisation [sic] members after nearly 
a decade spent comatose. The admission that Doha is no more is welcome: 
the talks were wasting a lot of breath, time, energy and air miles.3 
                                                
1 I am grateful to the three anonymous reviewers for their insights and comments, which helped to 
strengthen the argument. 
2 Rorden Wilkinson, Erin Hannah and James Scott, ‘The WTO in Nairobi: the demise of the Doha 
Development Agenda and the future of the multilateral trading system’, Global Policy, 7: 2 (May 2016), 
pp. 247-255.  Also, Daniel Flentø and Stefano Ponte, ‘Least-developed countries in a world of global 
value chains: are WTO trade negotiations helping?’, World Development, 94 (June 2017), pp. 369. 
3 ‘The Doha round finally dies a merciful death’, Financial Times, 21 December 2015. Available at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/9cb1ab9e-a7e2-11e5-955c-1e1d6de94879 For a different editorial view see, 
‘India needs to realise free trade is a myth’, Hindustan Times, 23 December 2015. 
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Heather Stewart, writing in The Guardian, was no less cutting in her assessment.   
 
Over the past few days, trade ministers from scores of countries have spent 
hours flogging the long-dead horse that is the Doha round of global trade 
talks in Nairobi – and hardly anyone noticed.4 
 
For all of the relief expressed by the delegates and observers gathered at the closing 
ceremony in the Kenyatta International Convention Centre5 and elsewhere, Nairobi 
rendered derelict the “complex cathedral” former WTO Director General Pascal Lamy 
characterised as the architecture of the Doha round, and “its own worst enemy”.6  
While the round’s abandonment may have been a source of celebration for some, the 
lack of a substantive outcome has inevitably encouraged jaundiced assessments of 
recent successes in multilateral trade politics.7  Indeed, when weighed against what was 
originally envisaged for the round’s conclusion and the actual contribution of the 
negotiations to increasing the volume and value of trade for individual member states, 
Doha looks to have been an abject failure, one that floundered on successive crises 
resulting from the inability of members to traverse differing understandings of the 
purposes and intended outcomes of the round.8 
 
Yet, there is another way to assess the past decade and a half of negotiations; one that 
requires looking beyond substantive outcomes—or the lack thereof—to ask what effect 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.hindustantimes.com/editorials/completely-free-trade-is-a-myth/story-
CRPQxVs9i8MH2C7qj4488L.html 
4 Heather Stewart ‘Doha is dead. Hopes for fairer global trade shouldn’t die, too’, The Guardian, 20 
December 2015.  Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/dec/20/doha-is-dead-
hopes-for-fairer-global-trade-shouldnt-die-too; also see Kevin Watkins, ‘What next for poor countries 
fighting to trade in an unfair world?’, The Guardian, 22 December 2015.  Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/dec/22/doha-round-world-trade-organisation-
nairobi-poor-countries  
5 Author observation during the closing ceremony. 
6 Lamy quoted in Robert E. Baldwin, ‘Trade negotiations within the GATT/WTO framework: a survey 
of success and failures’, Journal of Policy Modeling, 31: 4 (2009), p. 524. 
7 For example, Mihir Kanada, ‘Chronicles of the Doha wars: The battle of Nairobi—appraisal of the tenth 
WTO ministerial’, Strathmore Law Journal, August 2016, pp. 155-164; and Bryan Mercurio and Antoine 
Martin, ‘Doha Dead and Buried in Nairobi: Lessons for the WTO’, Journal of International Trade Law and 
Policy, 16: 1, doi: 10.1108/JITLP-01-2017-0001 
8 For an extensive insight into the differing perceptions of trade policy communities see Silke Trommer, 
‘The WTO in an era of preferential trade agreements: Thick and thin institutions in global trade 
governance’, World Trade Review, 16: 3 (2017), pp. 501-526. 
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the Doha negotiations have had on the way global trade is governed.  This shift in gaze 
brings into focus longer run issues of institutional development.  It also changes the 
way crises are understood, from disruptive incidents hampering outcomes to catalytic 
events spurring institutional change and evolution.  Thus, rather than episodes in the 
lingering demise of the Doha round, the moments of crisis and intransigence that beset 
the negotiations are revealed as key instances in which the governance of global trade 
was contested and its future direction renegotiated.9   
 
When viewed in this way, Nairobi takes on a different light.  Rather than an admission 
of the failure of members to agree a far-reaching trade deal, it signals the culmination of 
a terse political process that replaced one form of trade governance that had become 
dysfunctional (for the industrial countries at least) with another that is more 
expeditious (again, as far the industrial states are concerned).  This outcome saw trade 
governance move away from a system wherein all members sought to participate in—
and agreed to be bound by—a universal deal (known as a “single undertaking”) to one 
in which deals could be reached “plurilaterally”—that is, among a small subset of 
members.  The result has been to remove the capacity of one or a limited number of 
members to act as blockers in the onward march of liberalisation into new areas—as a 
number of developing countries had been.10  The quid pro quo for this change, however, 
was an agreement that while new trade deals could be negotiated plurilaterally, any 
attempt to pursue a new multilateral effort would first require that the Doha mandate 
be revisited.11  Yet, it is precisely because Doha had become so caustic that any return to 
the round is unlikely; and while the Nairobi outcome may place a multilateral deal off 
limits for the foreseeable future, it does open up the possibility that the paralysing 
effects of 14 years of largely unsuccessful negotiations will be unlocked and the WTO’s 
negotiating function rehabilitated.  
                                                
9 For an extended discussion of the locomotive effects of crises on the long run evolution of the 
multilateral trading system see Rorden Wilkinson, The WTO: Crisis and the Governance of Global Trade, 
(London: Routledge, 2006). In a similar vein see Valbona Muzaka and Matthew Louis Bishop, ‘Doha 
stalemate: The end of trade multilateralism?’ Review of International Studies, 41: 2, (2015), pp. 383-406. 
10 See Kristen Hopewell, Breaking the WTO: How Emerging Powers Disrupted the Neoliberal Project, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2016); and J. P. Singh, Sweet Talk: Paternalism and Collective Action in North-
South Trade Relations, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017).  
11 WTO, “Nairobi Ministerial Declaration”, WWT/MIN(15)/DEC, 19 November 2015, paragraph 34.  
Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc10_e/mindecision_e.htm  
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This rehabilitated does not come without costs, however.  For the industrial countries, 
the abandonment of the single undertaking brings with it a reduction in the scale of 
the trade gains that can be realised.  For developing countries, the setting aside of the 
commitment for all members to agree to—and be bound by—all aspects of an agreement 
erodes their capacity to ensure that the rectification of past trade anomalies forms part 
of any new bargain, which was a key demand in the run-up to the launch of the Doha 
round.12  This is because very few developing countries are likely to be parties to 
plurilateral agreements in areas of interest to the industrial states, who will be the 
drivers of any such deals. 
 
However, the abandonment of the single undertaking has another effect.  By locking 
developing countries out of any new negotiations it erodes their capacity to have a say 
in the future shape and direction of the multilateral trade regime.  This is quite a 
different outcome from that originally envisaged when the WTO was established and 
the Doha round launched.  But it is one that better enables the industrial states to 
regain control of a trade agenda that has failed to keep abreast of changes in global 
production and consumption. As United States Trade Representative (USTR) Michael 
Froman put it ahead of the Nairobi meeting,  
 
If global trade is to drive development and prosperity as strongly this 
century as it did in the previous, we need to write a new chapter for the 
World Trade Organisation [sic] that reflects today’s economic realities. It is 
time for the world to free itself of the strictures of Doha.13 
 
Importantly, this new form of trade governance is one that is not out of kilter with—or 
distinct from—previous ways of governing global trade.14  Rather, it is a return to a form 
                                                
12 See John S. Odell, ‘Breaking deadlocks in international institutional negotiations: The WTO, Seattle, 
and Doha’, International Studies Quarterly 53: 2 (2009), pp. 273-299 for an extended discussion. 
13 Michael Froman, ‘We are at the end of the line on the Doha Round of trade talks’, Financial Times, 13 
December 2015. Also, Daniel W. Drezner, ‘The United States tried to euthanize the Doha round: what 
we can learn from U.S. efforts to apply the coup de grace to multilateral trade negotiations’, The 
Washington Post, 14 December 2015. 
14 See, for instance, Gilbert R Winham, International Trade and the Tokyo Round, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1987). 
 5 
of trade governance analogous to earlier, pre-WTO forms of system management: 
hence, it is “retro” in constitution.  
 
Thus, the cumulative effect of the crises that beset the Doha round has been to move 
global trade governance away from the more inclusive broad-based system that emerged 
from—and which was very much a solution to the ills of—the Uruguay round and which 
shaped trade politics in the WTO’s early years, to a system that returns to a reliance on 
agreements reached among a limited subset of members to drive forward liberalisation 
and the agreement of new trade rules, and which is once again better suited to securing 
the evolving commercial interests of the industrial states than it is to solving the 
problems of their developing counterparts.  The result is to consolidate and preserve an 
iniquitous way of distributing trade gains that has been a characteristic of trade 
governance since the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was first 
negotiated in 1947.15   
 
Thus, the aim of this paper is to encourage a departure from a focus on the disruptive 
effects of negotiating crises and their role in hampering the realisation of specific 
outcomes in the multilateral trading system—and the Doha round particularly—to 
instead illustrate their generative effect on the refinement and evolution of global trade 
governance.  In this way, moments of crises and intransigence are understood as 
comprising—individually and in concert—a capacity to act as spurs in the overall 
development of global trade governance which can bring about substantive change but 
which have historically (both in the recent, as well as the relatively distant, past) tended 
to reinforce a bias towards the interests of the dominant commercial powers in that 
system.   
 
In pursuit of its aims, the paper begins by exploring some of the conceptual aspects of 
the role that negotiating crises play in promoting change and encouraging evolution in 
                                                
15 See, among others, Sylvia Ostry, ‘Asymmetry in the Post-Doha Trading System’ in Michele Fratianni, 
John J. Kirton and Paola Savona (eds.), Financing Development: The G8 and UN Contribution, (Aldershot: 
Ashgate 2007); Arvind Subramanian and Shang-Jin Wei, ‘The WTO promotes trade, strongly but not 
evenly’, Journal of International Economics, 72: 1 (May 2007), pp. 151-175; and Sanoussi Bilal, Philippe De 
Lombaerde and Diana Tussie (eds.), Asymmetric Trade Negotiations, (London: Routledge, 2011).  Also, 
Alan Matthews, ‘Developing countries’ position in WTO agricultural trade negotiations’, Development 
Policy Review, 20: 1 (2001), pp. 75-90. 
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the multilateral trading system.  It then establishes how the character of global trade 
governance has evolved so that we are able to see how the Nairobi outcome signals a 
return to an earlier form of system regulation and which renders the Uruguay round 
outcome as unique and unlikely to be repeated.  Thereafter, the paper traces the 
generative effects of the crises that beset the Doha round focusing on those trends, 
entanglements and outcomes pertinent to the development of the argument.  In the 
final section, the paper considers the effects of this changed form of governance for the 
future of the multilateral order. 
 
Crisis, evolution, change 
Novel as they may seem, moments of heightened political contestation, the collapse of 
negotiations, and the periods of intransigence that have followed have been endemic 
features of trade negotiations since the multilateral trading system’s inception.16  These 
events are usually attached to discrete occurrences in on-going rounds of negotiation or 
the launch thereof—such as the WTO’s Seattle, Cancún and Hong Kong ministerial 
conferences or informal but nonetheless high-level gatherings of state representatives 
such as the July 2008 Geneva mini-ministerial meeting—or else they are attached to 
wider events in the global political economy.17  
 
Taken individually, each crisis can act as a disruptor in the overall process of 
negotiating, either by causing a collapse in the negotiations or else ushering in a period 
of stasis.  Yet, when taken in the longue durée of the multilateral trading system they play 
a different role: as individual instances in a wider process of negotiating that can signal 
moments when change can or has the capacity to take place but in which entrenched 
interests have tended to prevail.  That change may be a refinement of existing ways of 
operating; it may generate an outcome that alters slightly the balance of forces among 
trading partners; or it may be that the capacity for change is ultimately realised.  What 
is important, however, is that in each instance crises are bound up with institutional 
                                                
16 Wilkinson, The WTO: Crisis and the Governance of Global Trade. 
17 See, for example, John S. Odell (2002), ‘The Seattle impasses and its implications for the WTO’, in 
Daniel Kennedy and James Southwick (eds.), The Political Economy of International Trade Law: essays in 
honor of Robert Hudec, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  Also Robert E. Hudec, ‘GATT or 
GABB? The future design of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’, Yale Law Journal, 80: 7 
(1971), pp. 1299-1386. 
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evolution.  While that evolution may be progressive or regressive—or somewhere in 
between—it will almost certainly unfold in a manner consistent with or in direct 
relation to the purposes for which the institution was originally created and the 
relations of power upon which it was founded and continues to operate. 
 
It is important to note that crises are endemic features of the multilateral trade regime 
because it is a system of governance generated by the outcomes of competitive 
negotiations.18   Member states are pitched against one another in strategic games 
wherein bargains are negotiated through the deployment of various means (strategic, 
material and otherwise), where the goal is to extract as much value as can be achieved 
while giving away as little as possible in institutional confines that shape participant 
interaction.  The bargains these interactions produce generate trade opportunities, 
rules governing the conduct of negotiations, procedures for the administration of the 
system, and precedents and behavioural norms that affect all aspects of the system’s 
operation.  They also all inevitably reflect power asymmetries and the distribution of 
capabilities among member states.19 
 
Yet, it is not competition alone that lends the global trade regime a crises-laden 
character.  It is also because the creation of the multilateral trading system imbued its 
architects—primarily the United States and, in its early years the United Kingdom, but 
also the industrial countries more generally—with certain advantages that later entrants 
to the system have sought to challenge and redress.20  These advantages arose not only 
from the construction of rules that reflected dominant commercial interests, but 
because those rules put in place measures to restrict the benefits of institutional 
                                                
18 See Rorden Wilkinson, What’s Wrong with the WTO and How to Fix it, (Cambridge: Polity, 2014), pp. 
45-78. 
19 Richard H. Steinberg, ‘The hidden world of WTO governance: a reply to Andrew Lang and Joanne 
Scott’, European Journal of International Law, 20: 4 (2009), pp. 1063-1071.  Also Andrew Lang and Joanne 
Scott, ‘The hidden world of WTO governance’, European Journal of International Law, 20: 3 (2009), pp. 
575-614. 
20 See Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: Anglo-American collaboration in the reconstruction of 
multilateral trade, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956); and Gardner Patterson, Discrimination in International 
Trade: The Policy Issues 1945-1965, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). 
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membership to new entrants.21  It is this continual privileging of the interests of the 
system’s architects that has, in turn, ensured that the multilateral trading system 
remains a site of contestation in which newer entrants challenge their established 
counterparts. 
 
The effects of this system have been profound and have been observed by economists 
and political economists alike. Correcting earlier work in economics that raised a 
question mark over the material benefit of global trade agreements, Arvind 
Subramanian and Shang-Jin Wei show empirically that GATT/WTO membership has 
indeed had a substantial effect on trade promotion.22  But they also show that these 
benefits have been so unevenly distributed in favour of the advanced industrial states 
that the magnitude of the gain from GATT/WTO membership has been vastly under-
estimated.23  Elsewhere, scholars have shown how distortions resulting from trade-offs 
made between participating states have contributed to the perpetuation of a system of 
iniquitous opportunity distribution wherein the lion’s share of trade opportunities have 
accrued to the GATT/WTO’s oldest and most commercially significant members.24  
The result, as Thomas Pogge has noted, is a system of global trade governance in which 
the leading industrial states “enjoy a crushing advantage”.25    
 
Thus, the development of the multilateral trading system has been a reflection of the 
outcomes and accommodations that have resulted from contestations between 
dominant and non-dominant participants caused by the competitive nature of 
negotiations and attempts to redress past iniquities.  Certainly there are other aspects of 
the system that appear not to be based on competition or contestation—dispute 
                                                
21 See Robert O. Keohane, Power and governance in a partially globalized world, (London: Routledge, 2002), 
pp. 253-254; Robert W. Cox, ‘Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay in method’, 
Millennium 12: 2 (1983), pp. 172-173. 
22 Subramanian and Wei, ‘The WTO promotes trade, strongly but not evenly’, pp. 151-175. 
23 See Andrew K. Rose, ‘Do we really know that the WTO increases trade?’, American Economic Review 94: 
1, 2004, pp. 98–114. 
24 See Sylvia Ostry, The Post-Cold War Trading System, (London: University of Chicago Press, 1997); and 
author; Tony Heron, The Global Political Economy of Trade Protectionism and Liberalization: Trade Reform and 
Economic Adjustment in Textiles and Clothing, (London: Routledge, 2012); and Ben Richardson, Sugar: 
Refined Power in a Global Regime, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2009). The date at which a country joins the 
GATT/WTO also has asymmetrical effects.  See Mark S. Copelovitch and David Ohls, ‘Trade, 
Institutions, and the Timing of GATT/WTO Accession in Post-Colonial States’, Review of International 
Organizations, 7: 1, 2012, pp. 81-107. 
25 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 2nd edition, pp. 26-27. 
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settlement, trade policy review, and data and knowledge gathering.  It is, however, 
important to remember that each of these attributes is itself an outcome of a 
negotiation and a product of the functioning of this competitive and adversarial system, 
and that each also reflects the distribution of power among member states. Therefore, it 
is by observing moments of contestation and understanding their causes, consequences 
and significance that a more accurate understanding of how the institution has evolved 
can be ascertained. And it is in this context that the passage of the Doha negotiations 
and the Nairobi outcome must be understood. 
 
The evolving nature of global trade governance 
To understand how crises during the Doha round have had a transformative effect on 
the way global trade is governed and how this has augmented—rather than eroded—the 
tendency to produce asymmetrical outcomes, we need to recover a little of the history 
of the multilateral trading system.  This, in turn, enables us to see how the Nairobi 
outcome ushers in a return to an older, more selective “retro” way of governing trade 
that is better able to maintain and preserve existing trade advantages at the expense of 
the more universalistic Uruguay outcome.   
 
The modern system of multilateral trade regulation over which the WTO presides was 
itself borne out of a series of crises.  At its creation, global trade governance took the 
form of a limited agreement (the GATT) among 23 contracting parties designed for the 
specific purpose of liberalising trade in goods among the industrial countries and kick-
starting the process of dismantling the protectionism that characterised the inter-war 
world economy.  It was also the outcome of a crisis in the negotiations for a broader 
International Trade Organization (ITO) that ultimately proved unresolvable and which 
resulted in the organisation’s still birth; and a series of terse political contestations 
among the GATT’s original contracting parties during the first round of negotiations 
almost floundered on disagreements on how to deal with agriculture and imperial 
preference and had a profound effect on what was, and what was not included in the 
General Agreement’s commercial remit—to which we return momentarily.26 
                                                
26 See, among others, Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: Anglo-American collaboration in the 
reconstruction of multilateral trade, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956); William Adams Brown Jr., The United 
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Given the role the GATT was designed to play, its architecture inevitably reflected the 
interests of its creators.  As the dominant party and primary architect, the GATT’s 
principal purpose was to assist the United States in the realisation of post-war economic 
gains as well as to forestall the onset of a post-war recession as its economy moved from 
a wartime to a peacetime footing.  This meant opening up overseas markets for its 
manufactured, semi-manufactured and capital goods as well as providing the financial 
wherewithal to enable its war-torn allies to buy US products.  The GATT was to 
provide the means by which markets were to be opened while the nascent World Bank 
would oversee European reconstruction (albeit later circumscribed by Marshall Aid) 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would provide payment stability through 
its administration of a system of fixed exchange rates.27 
 
Thereafter, the practices and procedures governing the conduct of world trade evolved 
steadily over time and the striking of bargains during trade rounds placed new layers of 
regulation on top of those previously negotiated.  Crucially, however, agreements were 
only reached among a subset of commercially significant members (see table 1).  These 
agreements—which we would now characterise as “plurilateral”—28 led to portrayals of 
the GATT as a “trader’s club” functioning for the benefit of the biggest trading nations 
alone.29  As Robert Hudec put it, the GATT was the “property” of the industrial 
countries, “a place where [they] … could go off to do business by themselves”.30  This 
remained the case throughout consecutive negotiations.   
                                                                                                                                      
States and the Restoration of World Trade, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1950); Karin Kock, 
International Trade Policy and the GATT, 1947-1967, (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1969); Clair 
Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade, (London: Macmillan, 1949); William Diebold Jr., ‘The End of the 
ITO’, Essays in International Finance, 16, (International Finance Section, Department of Economics, 
Princeton University, 1952); and Richard Toye, ‘The Attlee Government, the Imperial Preference System 
and the Creation of the GATT’, The English Historical Review, 118: 478 (2003), pp. 912-939. 
27 See William L. Clayton, ‘GATT, the Marshall Plan, and OECD’, Political Science Quarterly, 78: 4 
(1963), pp. 493-503. 
28 For recent interventions see Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis, ‘WTO ‘á la carte’ or ‘menu du 
jour’? Assessing the case for more plurilateral agreements’, European Journal of International Law, 26: 2 
(2015), pp. 319-343; and Kenneth Heydon, ‘Plurilateral agreements and global trade governance: a lesson 
from the OECD’, Journal of World Trade, 48: 5 (2014), pp. 1039-1055. 
29 Gerard Curzon and Victoria Curzon, ‘GATT: Trader’s Club’, in Robert W. Cox and Harold K. 
Jacobson (eds.), The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization, (London: Yale 
University Press, 1974), 2nd print. 
30 Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy, (Salem, MA: Butterworth Legal 
Publisher, 1990), second edition, p. 57. 
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The Tokyo round (1973-1979) saw for the first time pressure for a greater number of 
participants to be bound by the outcome of the negotiations.31  The driving rationale 
here was to increase the gains from trade negotiations, particularly for the industrial 
countries, by binding a greater number of contracting parties to market access and 
related commitments.  But to do so required a change in the practice of governing 
global trade, moving from agreements among a subset of participants to a more 
universalistic system.  These ambitions, however, failed to come to fruition.  During the 
negotiations, stand-offs between the industrial countries and their developing 
counterparts in areas such as non-tariff barriers, voluntary export restraints, the multi-
fibre arrangement, safeguards, “market disruption” and “aggressive export practices”, 
among others, led to the abandonment of these efforts and resulted instead in the 
agreement of a number of sector specific plurilateral agreements. 32 
 
Table 1—Trade rounds under the GATT and WTO 
Date Round No. of contracting parties 
exchanging concessions 
1947 Geneva 23 out of 23 
1949 Annecy 33 out of 33 
1950-1951 Torquay 29 out of 33 
1956 Geneva 22 out of 39 
1960-1961 The Dillon round 22 out of 42 
1964-1967 The Kennedy round 37 out of 76 
1973-1979 The Tokyo round 44 out of 84 
1986-1994 The Uruguay round 123 out of 123 
2001-2015 The Doha round abandoned 
 
A second attempt to bind a greater number of participants was tried during the 
Uruguay round (1986-1994).  Unlike the Tokyo round endeavour, the Uruguay 
negotiations proved successful and concluded with a single undertaking. This ranged 
across the full spectrum of the negotiations taking in disciplines on merchandise trade, 
services, agriculture, and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights and 
                                                
31  See paragraph 1 of the Tokyo Declaration, 14 September 1973.  Available at: 
http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/641c04eb-2900-4ac3-b07d-
1a0467477cdc/publishable_en.pdf  
32  See Rorden Wilkinson and James Scott, ‘Developing country participation in the GATT: a 
reassessment’, World Trade Review, 7: 3 (2008), pp. 499-502. 
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investment measures, along with institutional innovations in, among other things, 
dispute settlement and trade policy review.   
 
However, it is worth bearing in mind that although a single undertaking was a 
desideratum at the launch of the Uruguay round it only became a viable option as part 
of a wider solution to the problems that had beset the negotiations.  Much like the 
Doha round, from the outset the Uruguay negotiations had been terse and contested.33  
Deep fractures had appeared between the positions of the contracting parties very early 
on into the negotiations and proved tenacious.  These fractures led to frequent periods 
of crisis and collapse as well as a general stasis in the negotiations.  It was not until an 
idea gathered ground that gains could also be made by reviewing and enhancing the 
institutional aspects of the GATT—under the auspices of the Functioning of the GATT 
System (FOGS)—that a solution was reached.34  
 
This switch of focus toward a programme of institutional refinement and regeneration 
built upon a widespread sense of frustration among contracting parties that GATT 
disciplines were all-too-often treated in a cursory fashion.  This, in turn, created an 
opportune moment for a proposal to be advanced to establish a Multilateral Trade 
Organization (MTO) that would bring significant institutional gains.35  The proposal 
contained, among other things, provisions for a more robust dispute settlement 
process; better review, notification and surveillance measures; and a commitment to 
improve co-ordination between the MTO, the IMF and the World Bank.  At the same 
time, it would oversee regulations across a wider range of trade than had been the case 
under the GATT (which had been confined largely to trade in industrial goods)36 
                                                
33 See S. P. Shukla, ‘From GATT to WTO and Beyond’, UNU/WIDER Working Papers, No. 195 (August 
2000), pp. 1-65.  Available at: www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/.../en.../wp195.pdf 
34 See Ernest H. Preeg, Traders in a brave new world: the Uruguay round and the future of the international trading 
system, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995), pp. 74-78; and Rorden Wilkinson, ‘Transforming our 
world by 2030: The multilateral trading system and the new agenda for global action’, International Trade 
Working Paper, 2015/02, (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2015), pp. 6-7. 
35 The American Society of International Law and Nederlandse Vereniging voor International Recht, 
Contemporary International Law Issues: Opportunities at a Time of Momentous Change—Proceedings of the Second 
Joint Conference, The Hague, 22-24 July 1993, p. 300; and John H. Jackson, Restructuring the GATT System, 
(London: Pinter, 1990). 
36 Patrick Low, ‘Potential Future Functions of the World Trade Organization’, Global Governance, 15: 3 
(2009), pp. 330-331. 
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bringing in services, agriculture, and trade-related intellectual property rights and 
investment measures.   
 
Crucially, for the institution to be created the agreement of all parties to the 
negotiations had to be secured.  Anything less would have left the organisation 
moribund.  The result was a trade and an institutional bargain that required a common 
and universally binding agreement for it to be sealed.  This agreement to a single 
undertaking was possible only because the promise of a better functioning system of 
rules attenuated some of the concerns that contracting parties—particularly developing 
countries—had about imbalances in the market access aspects of the deal, something 
that was wholly absent during the Doha negotiations.   
 
However, there was a darker more coercive aspect to the Uruguay agreement.  The 
institutional components of the agreement enabled the industrial countries to pressure 
their developing counterparts to sign up to the Uruguay accords (and thus the 
disadvantageous commercial provisions therein) for fear that they would be left out of 
the multilateral trading system as the United States, European Community and others 
transitioned across to the WTO.  As Michael Finger and Julio Nogués put it, 
 
The proposal to create a new organisation to contain and administer the 
Uruguay Round agreements changed the game. The GATT/WTO 
heavyweights announced that as soon as the new organisation existed they 
would withdraw from the GATT. A country that voted ‘No’ on joining the 
new organisation would leave itself out in the cold – with neither GATT 
disciplines nor those of the new agreement to protect it.37 
 
The uniqueness of the Uruguay single undertaking was, however, quickly forgotten and 
the expectation that a universal deal could be negotiated again became a key 
desideratum of the Doha round.  For the industrial countries the gains that a single 
undertaking had brought ensured they were keen to repeat it in a new round.  In 
contrast, the developing countries—who had quickly realised that irrespective of the 
institutional benefits of the Uruguay agreement, the deal had been considerably less 
                                                
37 J. Michael Finger and Julio J. Nogués, ‘The Unbalanced Uruguay Round Outcome: The New Areas in 
Future WTO Negotiations’, The World Economy, 25: 3 (2002), p. 334. 
 14 
beneficial to them than their industrial counterparts38—looked upon a second single 
undertaking as a way of resisting another Uruguay style bargain by capitalising on the 
strength in numbers that an expansion in membership had brought.   
 
The key difference here was that the objective of the Doha round was to agree a 
common deal under the auspices of a normal trade round.  It did not involve the 
introduction of a single undertaking as a necessary component of a solution to the 
ailments of a round and which was part and parcel of a wider institutional project or 
other such endeavour enabling members to see benefits that may nullify anomalies 
elsewhere in the negotiations—as Uruguay had been.  Yet, it was the pressure to agree to 
a second single undertaking that brought into sharp relief many of the problems with 
the WTO’s negotiating functioning, which played—in the early years of the round at 
least—a crucial role in the binding together of large and complex coalitions of members, 
and which ultimately sealed the round’s fate. 
 
It is worth bearing in mind that widespread dissatisfaction with the Uruguay round 
framed the Doha negotiations for developing countries; and the institutional bargain 
that facilitated Uruguay’s conclusion proved to be small beer compared to the 
commercial iniquities that quickly became apparent thereafter.  As Sylvia Ostry 
famously put it, the Uruguay round was “a bum deal”, in which, The Economist noted, 
the “rich countries cut their tariffs by less … than poor ones”, and wherein, as Nelson 
Mandela argued, it was ‘the preoccupations and problems of the advanced industrial 
economies that shaped the agreement’.39   
 
What was wrong with the Uruguay outcome and how did it shape developing country 
expectations in the Doha negotiations?  The conclusion of the Uruguay round saw the 
inclusion of agreements on agriculture, and textiles and clothing within a wider suite of 
trade agreements administered by the soon-to-be-created WTO and the adoption of a 
                                                
38 Ostry, The Post-Cold War Trading System; also Andrew D. Mitchell and Tania Voon, ‘Operationalizing 
Special and Differential Treatment in the World Trade Organization: Came Over?’, Global Governance, 
15: 3 (2009), p. 343. 
39 Ostry, The Post-Cold War Trading System, p. 28; The Economist, ‘White man’s shame: rich countries say 
free trade in good for poor countries. Pity they don’t practice what they preach’, 23 September 1999; 
Mandela, Nelson, Statement on the 50th Anniversary of the Multilateral Trading System, Geneva, 19 May 
1998. Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min98_e/anniv_e/mandela_e.htm 
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range of provisions throughout the organisation’s legal framework designed to ease 
some of the pressure for domestic legislative reform generated by the new rules.  It also 
resulted in the adoption of agreements on services (the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services—GATS), intellectual property (the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights—TRIPs) and investment measures (the Agreement on Trade Related 
Investment Measures—TRIMs).  Yet, while the inclusion of agriculture, and textiles and 
clothing rectified an existing imbalance in the GATT’s commercial purview, and the 
addition of a few development facing but insubstantial provisions represented a step 
forward from the GATT-era, the introduction of new disciplines in services, intellectual 
property and investment measures simply generated additional advantages for the 
industrial states.  Thus, while under Uruguay rules developing states could finally hope 
to benefit from the liberalisation of agricultural, and textiles and clothing markets, their 
lack of capacity and resources ensured that this was not to be the case in the new areas.  
The potential benefits of Uruguay were, however, much more compelling for the 
industrial states.  Not only were they existing beneficiaries of trade liberalisation in 
areas covered by GATT rules, their economic make-up ensured they would be the 
principal beneficiaries of the market opportunities presented by the liberalisation of 
services and investment measures, and the codification of trade-related intellectual 
property rights. 
 
The consequence was to further divide up the arenas of economic activity in which 
member states could specialise and, in so doing, magnify the challenges facing 
developing countries seeking to diversify their export portfolios.  Moreover, not only 
were the industrial states better suited to taking advantage of these new rules, their 
ability to utilise the market opportunities presented therein would enable them to 
develop further competitive advantages over future market entrants.  The result was to 
carry across the transition from GATT to WTO an asymmetry of economic 
opportunity that formed the basis upon the Doha round unfolded, which underpinned 
the tensions that existed among members, and which saw the round lurch from crisis to 
collapse over the course of a decade and a half.   
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It is unsurprising then, that the Uruguay agreements proved to be a source of 
frustration for developing countries; and efforts to extend further the trade agenda in 
the wake of Uruguay’s conclusion were greeted with hostility.  This was particularly the 
case with suggestions that the WTO’s remit be strengthened to include investment, 
government procurement, competition policy, trade facilitation, environmental 
protection and, most controversially, labour standards at the 1996 Singapore 
ministerial conference and that the members embark on a further round of trade 
negotiations so soon after the conclusion of Uruguay.40  It was also clear that not only 
were a number of developing countries struggling with the implementation 
requirements of the Uruguay round agreements, a good deal of foot-dragging and back-
sliding was taking place on the part of their industrial counterparts.  These tensions 
steadily increased coming to a head at the WTO’s 1999 Seattle ministerial conference 
when, amid mass demonstrations outside the convention centre delegates failed to 
agree the launch of what was then touted as the “millennium round”.   
 
The Seattle ministerial conference failed to launch a new round because of perceptions 
among developing countries that their industrial counterparts were trying to press 
forward with a new trade agenda without first attending to existing anomalies.  
Moreover, given that the Uruguay round had set a precedent—and an expectation—for a 
single undertaking to form the basis upon which any new set of negotiations would be 
concluded, it was inevitable that a new set of talks would have to address the demands 
of developing states.  Inevitably, then, the post-Seattle rehabilitation process saw a 
concerted effort to place development at the heart of the campaign to launch a new 
trade round.  Eventually a concerted consensus building effort and a delicate post 9/11 
global political climate proved sufficient for members to agree to a new round at the 
November 2001 Doha ministerial conference—officially named the “Doha 
Development Agenda” (DDA).   
 
There were undoubted successes in tailoring the work programme towards areas of 
interest to the developing world.  The Doha Ministerial Declaration was replete with 
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World Trade, 35: 3 (2001), pp. 397-419. 
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references to the needs and interests of developing countries. A Ministerial Decision on 
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns was agreed and the main Ministerial 
Declaration made implementation issues an integral part of the work programme.  The 
agricultural negotiations were designed to pursue substantial improvements in market 
access and sought to reduce (and the eventually eliminate) export subsidies and trade-
distorting domestic support systems.  The negotiations on non-agricultural market 
access (NAMA) were structured such that the reduction and elimination of tariff peaks, 
high tariffs, tariff escalation, tariffs affecting the export interests of developing countries 
and non-tariff barriers sat alongside a more traditional focus on the reduction of 
barriers to trade.  With regard to intellectual property, a declaration on TRIPs and 
public health offered members greater flexibility in adhering to the TRIPs agreement in 
times of national health crises.  And more generally, promises were made to explore the 
relationships between trade, debt and finance, the plight of small economies, the 
transfer of technology, technical co-operation and capacity building, as well as to review 
and strengthen special and differential provisions. 
 
However, the balance of potential gains from the work programme remained firmly 
with the industrial states.  In addition to the benefits resulting from the full 
implementation of the Uruguay accords, improvements in NAMA, aspects of the 
negotiations on agriculture, and a further extension of the TRIPs agreement, the Doha 
agenda added a commitment to begin (albeit on the basis that an “explicit consensus” 
should be forthcoming) negotiations in investment, government procurement, trade 
facilitation and competition policy (and possibly e-commerce).  Moreover, the agenda 
put in place a specific timeframe in which negotiations would commence on these 
issues (subject to minor clarification, after the mid-term review of negotiations in 
Cancún in 2003) and stipulated that the results would form the basis of a second single 
undertaking.  The result, despite its moniker, was that the new round promised merely 
to address a handful of existing anomalies of interest to developing countries in return 
for a further extension of the WTO’s legal framework into areas of interest to the 
industrial countries where there were better prospects for substantive material gain. 
 
 18 
Unsurprisingly, the imbalances in the Doha mandate quickly became the source of 
developing country frustrations.  These frustrations were manifest in a frenzy of 
coalition building that saw alliance upon (counter-)alliance of members combine and 
consolidate to produce a deadlock in the negotiations which, in turn, contributed to 
the collapse of the 2003 Cancún ministerial conference.41  Indeed, the only common 
ground that Cancún produced was that the round would not reach a conclusion before 
its scheduled 1 January 2005 deadline. 
 
After an initial period of reflection, and much like Seattle, the post-Cancún period saw 
renewed energy emerge among the WTO membership.  In early 2004 both the United 
States and European Union signalled that they were ready to negotiate the elimination 
of all forms of agricultural export subsidies (including credits and food aid as well as 
more traditional means of subsidising exports). 42   By June 2004 then-WTO DG 
Supachai Panitchpakdi was praising delegates for the progress that had been made in 
the agricultural negotiations (albeit peppered with the obligatory encouragement to 
keep moving forward).  Each of the principal protagonists in the Cancún showdown 
submitted papers outlining their preferred ways of moving forward—the Group of 20, 
Group of 10 and Group of 33—and the European Union again stressed its willingness 
to phase out export subsidies on the condition that other (largely US) forms of 
subsidising exports were eliminated and that an “acceptable” outcome could be reached 
on market access and domestic support.  These developments nevertheless proved 
insufficient to enable members to agree a set of negotiating modalities ahead of the 
2005 Hong Kong ministerial conference that would take the negotiations to the next 
phase.  The result was a decision to scale-back expectations ahead of the Hong Kong 
meeting to ensure that some agreement was reached and to build upon the momentum 
that had gathered in the negotiations since the collapse at Cancún. 
 
                                                
41 Amrita Narlikar and Rorden Wilkinson, ‘Collapse at the WTO: A Cancún post-mortem’, Third World 
Quarterly, 25: 3 (April 2004), pp. 447-460. 
42 Jennifer Clapp, ‘WTO agricultural trade battles and food aid’, Third World Quarterly, 25: 8 (2004), p. 
1444. 
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The conclusion of the Hong Kong ministerial conference proved to be a high point, 
however.43  The April 2006 deadline for agreeing negotiating modalities decided at the 
meeting was missed; little progress was made in the negotiations generally; and the 
round came to an abrupt halt in July 2006.  Repeated attempts thereafter failed to 
inject new momentum into the round and the negotiations formally collapsed in the 
July 2008.44  What followed was almost 5 years of negotiating stasis.  Lukewarm 
attempts were made to restart the negotiations.  A four-year pause between ministerial 
conferences (between Hong Kong in 2005 and Geneva in 2009) failed to inject 
renewed momentum.  The 2009 Geneva ministerial conference was actively engineered 
to take heat out of the negotiations but neither it, nor the convening of a second 
ministerial in Geneva two years later, succeeded in moving beyond entrenched 
positions.45 
 
It was not until the run-up to the 2013 Bali ministerial conference that negotiating 
began again in earnest.  Even then the long running war of attrition that had followed 
ensured that members were unable to agree a deal ahead of the meeting.  What ensued 
was a frenetic bout of negotiating over five long days wherein hopes were raised, 
dashed, raised and almost dashed again before members agreed to a small package of 
measures covering three broad areas (trade facilitation, agriculture, and special and 
differential treatment for least-developed countries).46 
 
The agreement reached in Bali was notable because it marked the first multilateral 
agreement concluded under WTO auspices since the organisation had begun 
operations on 1 January 1995.  It was not, however, a game changing moment marking 
a new era in multilateral trading system correcting past imbalances or inequities, or 
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closing the gap between developed and developing countries alike.  Nor was the 
outcome a broad-based single undertaking.  Instead, Bali continued the pattern of 
asymmetrical bargains by agreeing a deal that would bring greater benefits to the 
industrial countries (via the Agreement on Trade Facilitation) in exchange for limited 
concessions in agriculture (relating to public stockpiling of foodstuffs) and a small 
package of measures designed to help least-developed countries.  In the long arc of the 
multilateral trading system’s history, Bali was very much business as usual. 
 
Nairobi, “retro” trade governance and the future of the multilateral order 
The agreement reached in Bali came despite enduring tensions between the major 
players over the shape and direction of the trade agenda.  Indeed, it was only after a 
follow up bilateral agreement had been reached between the United States and India in 
November 2014 extending indefinitely the protection afforded to developing country 
agricultural stockholding programmes from challenges under the WTO’s dispute 
settlement mechanism until a “permanent solution” could be negotiated that the Bali 
outcome could finally be implemented.47  What was obvious was that the WTO’s 
negotiating function was still clogged with sand and a more radical solution was 
required if the institution’s credibility was to recover its worth.  The result was the 
reaching of an agreement in Nairobi to set the round aside for the sake of salvaging the 
institution, with the caveat that any future attempt to negotiate multilaterally required 
that Doha first be revisited.   
 
The agreement reached in Nairobi transforms fundamentally the framework for 
conducting trade negotiations moving it away from one targeted at broad-based 
universal deals to something more lithe and multi-faceted.  This transformation was 
widely seen as a necessary component to a rekindling of faith in the organisation’s 
negotiating function and an important counter to “mega regional” trade deals such as 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP).  However, reinvigorating the WTO’s negotiating function came at 
the expense of the Doha round and efforts to agree to a wide-ranging multilateral deal 
                                                
47 Rorden Wilkinson, ‘Changing power relations in the WTO: Why the India-U.S. trade agreement 
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on trade measures for development.  That said, Nairobi did see members agree to a 
package of trade measures comprising agreements on agriculture and on least-developed 
country issues as well as an expansion in the 1996 Information Technology Agreement 
(ITA) though the balance of these measures clearly favoured the industrial countries 
continuing the long-standing pattern of asymmetrical deals being negotiated. 
 
In combination, these outcomes mark a critical juncture in the evolution of the 
multilateral trading system enabling the leading industrial members to move away from 
the pursuit of universal agreements wherein a balance of concessions is required that 
are acceptable to all members, back to one where they are more able to focus on narrow 
piecemeal deals that exclude troublesome states.  It also sets aside the pursuit of a single 
undertaking, which was the primary means by which emerging powers were able to 
withstand and temper the ability of the United States and European Union to 
dominate negotiations.  All of this results from a process of institutional development 
wherein the outcomes of moments of heightened political contestation have combined 
to produce a retro form of global trade governance. 
 
The consequences of this change in the modus operandi of governance are significant 
and break with 4 decades of endeavour to conclude negotiations on a universal basis.  
Not only does the decision re-introduce the conclusion of small group agreements as a 
normal means by which negotiations are concluded, it also amounts to a recognition 
that the pursuit of universal agreements is too difficult without some kind of 
institutional bargain.  This, in turn, reduces the capacity of developing countries to 
secure trade-offs from developed countries in return for concessions in new areas. 
 
Conclusion 
The Financial Times put it that “Doha is dead. Its passing should not be mourned.  It 
opens up space for trade multilateralism to return”.48  While this may have been a 
catchy strapline, the truth is a little more complex.  Certainly the Doha round is 
moribund and there little chance it will ever be rehabilitated.  However, one aspect of 
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its passing should be mourned.  The abandonment of the single undertaking removes 
irrecoverably the capacity of developing countries to have a say in the shape, direction 
and content of any future negotiations.  They, and their interests, will not be 
represented as the multilateral trading system moves back to deals brokered among 
subsets of members on specific issues unlikely to be of interest to them (or in which 
they are unlikely to be allowed to participate) as the engine of further liberalisation and 
the modus operandi of system governance.  Without a requirement to negotiate with 
members that are commercially less significant there will be no compunction for the 
industrial states to deliver trade gains that matter for development.  The result is that 
Doha’s passing has not allowed multilateralism to return.  Instead, it has allowed 
plurilateralism to prevail, with the obvious consequences that special interest trade 
politics will have.  This is what Lorand Bartels argues has been going on outside of the 
single undertaking anyway.49  Nairobi has just brought it back inside. 
 
Turning specifically to the role of crises, what this reading of the trials and tribulations 
of the Doha round reveals is a different way of understanding the locomotive aspects of 
system evolution.  Its purpose has been to show that far from being disruptive elements, 
moments of crisis are actually consequences of the way the institution was created and 
has evolved through time. Moreover, they are important elements in securing its 
onward development.  But these insights tell us not only about one aspect of the 
manner in which the institution has evolved, they also caution against analyses that 
focus overly on individual moments in global trade politics as barometers of system 
wellbeing.  These shorter run perspectives tend to focus too much on the hyperbole 
and drama that surrounds the collapse of a ministerial conference or the stasis injected 
into a negotiation, inevitably bemoaning—often rather heavy-heartedly—the missed 
opportunity to generate genuine material gain.  Whereas, a longer lens takes in the 
cumulative effects of periods of crisis on the bargains reached over time and their 
impact on the institution’s evolution.  As Robert Wolfe has observed, despite most 
GATT/WTO meetings having been ‘near catastrophes … the trading system is stronger, 
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deeper and wider now than it was a generation ago’.50  However, this is not a view that 
comfortably or abstractly observes longer run processes of institutional development 
leaving the analysis to stand as mere objective study.  Rather, it is one that is able to 
show how asymmetrical gains from multilateral trade are realised and the benefits 
iniquitously distributed, which in turn sharpens the case for system reform. 
 
The final observation to draw from the passage of the Doha round is how tenacious the 
institution has been in serving the interests of the dominant powers.  This is, in part, 
why some have argued that when thinking about reform of the multilateral trading 
system only a fundamental overhaul will halt the perpetuation of this state of affairs.51  
Doing otherwise contributes to the tenacity of the institution’s evolution while doing 
very little to ameliorate the consequences of mal-distributed trade opportunity and 
gain. Indeed, it is likely that until or unless a dramatic shift in the global balance of 
power occurs, an alternative ideological consensus develops, a viable competing 
institutional framework emerges, and/or a fundamental overhaul of the WTO takes 
place (involving an alteration of its core principles) the collapse of ministerial meetings 
and the onset of a post-crisis politics thereafter will continue to be features of 
multilateral trade regulation for some time to come—particularly when trade deals are 
attempted among large numbers of participants.  Such a rupture in prevailing power 
relations would not, however, bring with it any assurances that the institutions put in 
place to govern the globe would be any better.  Conceivably they—and any new 
configuration of power that ushers them in—may be far worse.  
 
The future for the WTO and the multilateral trading system is thus mixed.  On the one 
hand, it is clear that the Nairobi outcome will unlock some of the energy that has been 
absent from the multilateral system for some time and enable the WTO to preside over 
future agreements.  On the other hand, in the absence of a universal endeavour there is 
very little to force the industrial countries to focus on negotiations that are of specific 
interest to their developing counterparts, particularly when the return to a plurilateral 
form of governance promises to serve their interests better than Doha did.   
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